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Abstract: This paper examines the impact of governance on sustainable development in West Africa 
from 2002 – 2016. It adopts the system GMM approach, using all the six governance indicators, which 
include voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule 
of law and control of corruption. The results show that voice and accountability, political stability, 
government effectiveness and rule of law are positively related to development, with government 
effectiveness shown to have that largest impact, while regulatory quality and control of corruption are 
shown to be indirectly related to development in the short-run. However, in the long-run, all governance 
indicators are directly related to development in West African countries, with political stability and 
regulatory quality having the largest impact. 
Keywords: Governance; West Africa; Economic Development; System GMM 
JEL Classification: F63 
 
1. Introduction 
The desire to unravel the puzzles of factors influencing growth and development of 
nations has led to the development of many growth literatures (Nordhaus, 1992; 
Rajan & Zingales, 1998; Li, 2000; Solow, 1956). Most of these literatures 
(Nordhaus, 1992; Rajan & Zingales, 1998; Li, 2000; Solow, 1956) attributed capital 
and productivity to growth and development. However, Solow (1956), whose model 
serves as the basic reference point for almost all growth analysis, submitted that 
capital alone cannot account for the growth of nations; neither can it alone explain 
the vast geographical difference in output per head across nations. This submission 
has led to the development of other hypothesis and models to better explain the 
mystery behind growth and development of nations (Romer, 2012). Hall and Jones 
(1999) hypothesized that differences in capital accumulation, level of productivity, 
and consequently output across nations can be accounted for by differences in their 
social infrastructures. Social infrastructure is explained to be the institutions and 
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governance that influence the economic environment within which other economic 
agents (households and firms) accumulate skills, capital, and produce output. 
Governance has been described as the traditional and institution by which rules, 
regulations and other authorities of the state are executed (Kaufmann et al., 2010). 
The hypothesis that governance influences growth and development is supported by 
the works of (Knack & Keefer, 1997; Campos & Nugent, 1999; Acemoglu et al., 
2000) and (UNDP, 2014) who posits that governance cannot be isolated from 
development and included it as one of the sustainable development goals. Contrary 
to this assertion, there are various scholars who have claimed that the influence of 
governance on development is rather over rated. Some argued that literatures linking 
governance to development are not without their problems. Bardhan (2005) 
identified omitted variable bias, Chong and Caldron (2000) challenged it on the 
ground of causality problems, Glaseer, et al (2004) on measurement errors and Weiss 
(2000) on conceptual vagueness.  
Kaufmann, et al (2002) claimed that growth can be generated without institutional 
changes or government factor, and in fact, there is a tendency that high income level 
leads to better governance and not the other way round. He added that one of the 
most difficult issues in the field of governance is the imperfect understanding of how 
politics shapes governance and the development outcome Similarly, Grindle (2010) 
expresses her skepticism about the idea that good governance is essential to the 
development of a nation. She premised her argument on the economic growth of 
China, which has low rank in most governance indexes, yet, has enjoyed high rate 
of growth and development over several years. According to Kaufmann et al. (2005), 
good governance indicators can be classified into six; voice and accountability, 
political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and 
control of corruption. The relevance of these indicators is well documented in 
literatures (Fisman & Svensson, 2007); Easterly et al, 2006; Lewis, 2006; Dollar et 
al, 2006; Loayza et al, 2006). 
Going by these indicators, West African countries have not fared well in the rating 
over the decades. It was rated, on the average -0.61, -0.81 and -0.82 for government 
effectiveness in 2002, 2008, and 2016 out of a scale of 2.5, a category classified as 
to too low by standard (WGI, 2017). On the other hand, the level of development in 
many African countries has been disappointing over the decades (Emara & Chiu, 
2016). Relating governance to development, Chauvet and Collier (2004), find that 
developing countries with poor quality of governance will lead to less economic 
development. If this is true, the anticipated development in West African countries 
might be decades away judging by the governance indicators for the region.  
In the light of this, it is incumbent to re-examine the merits of the proposition that 
governance significantly matters for development, and by implication, of policy 
prescription that developing countries should concentrate more on governance 
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enhancing reform if they want to achieve development. This study therefore seeks to 
empirically investigate the effect of governance on economic development in West 
Africa. This study will contribute to knowledge in the following ways; first, it is one 
of the first studies that will empirically investigate the effect of governance on 
development in West Africa as a whole. Second, in terms of methodology, most 
work (Okeke & Eme, 2015; Vehovar & Jager, 2003; Kassem, 2014; Sebudubudu, 
2010). on governance adopted descriptive method of analysis, except for few 
(Albassam, 2013; Emara & Chiu, 2016; Karim et al, 2013; Alomaisi et al., 2016; 
Pere, 2015) in European countries and other part of Africa1 who adopted estimation 
techniques on governance and development. Also, this will be one of the first studies 
in West Africa to look at the short-run and the long-run impact of governance on 
development in West Africa. This study will adopt a dynamic panel model of 
estimation, particularly, the Arellano and Bond Generalized Method of Moment. 
Dynamic panel model better captures the dynamic relationships between economic 
variables. Also, it2 is one of the prominent estimation techniques for dynamic panel 
when N is large and T is small (Batalgi, 2008). 
Objectives of the Study 
The broad objective of the study is to empirically investigate the impact of 
governance on economic development in West Africa. The specific objectives are; 
i. to empirically investigate the short-run impact of governance on development in 
West Africa 
ii. to empirically investigate the long-run impact of governance on development in 
West Africa 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Theorectical Review 
Various attempts have been made by scholars to answer the questions of what causes growth 
and prosperities of nations, particularly, identifying factors responsible for the difference in 
growth rate among nations. Most of these scholars initially focused on physical and human 
capital, total factor productivity, technological progress, the progress of knowledge creation 
and diffusion and international trade (Helpman, 2004). These factors however, have not been 
able to provide satisfactory answers to the questions surrounding development of nations 
(Solow, 1956). Consequent to this, some scholars (Feng, 2003); Przeworski et al, 2001; 
Knack & Keefer, 1995; Mauro, 1995; Alesina, 1998) have begun to recognize that the roles 
of politics and institutions are vital to the process of development by influencing the 
incentives to accumulate, and accommodate changes  
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Research looking into whether governance promotes or hinders economic 
development has produced three (3) schools of thought. The first is the conflict 
school which believes that democracy hinders economic growth, but mostly in 
developing countries, by creating consumption pressures, instigating distributional 
conflict and discouraging capital accumulation. The proponents of this theory 
adopted the case of South Korea, Taiwan, and Chile as evidence that “good for 
growth” dictatorship could create right condition for development by providing 
sources of political order and social control. This conclusion however, was debunked 
by Przeworski et al (2000), who empirically investigated the experiences of 135 
countries and found that there is no trade-off between democracy and development.  
The second is the compatibility theory that posits that governance positively 
influences growth, because the presence of fundamental human right and political 
right create the social environment conducive for economic development. This 
theory has been invested by Knack and Keefer (1995), Mauro (1995) and Alesina 
(1998) who confirm the existence of positive relationships between governance and 
growth. The third is the skeptical school that claims that there is no systematic 
relationship between governance and development. 
According to Olson (1996) and Knack (2003), the linkages between governance and 
growth has been able to address some of the anomalies of the old and new growth 
theories, which were not able to explain the determinants of developments in most 
countries.  
2.2. Empirical Literature 
Since the end of 1980s, the importance of good governance has been dominating the 
international discussion about development and international assistance to Africa 
(Wohlmuth, 1998). This has led to various empirical investigations into the relevance 
of government, amidst other factors to growth and developments; 
Habtumu (2008) conducted an empirical study on the roles of governance on 
economic performance in Sub-sahara Africa (SSA) between 1996 and 2005, using 
system and differenced GMM. He found that rule of law, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, political instability and voice as well as accountability influence 
growth in SSA, however, control of corruption has no influence on economic 
performance in the region. Similarly, Cooray (2009) investigated the influence of 
governance on economic growth and development in 71 countries (including 
developed, developing and transitioning countries) adopting the same methodology 
found that both size and quality of governance are important for economic growth, 
and in fact, investing in the capacity for enhanced government is a priority for the 
improved growth performance of the countries investigated. Their findings is 
corroborated in the works of Knack and Keefer (1997); Campos and Nugent (1999); 
Acemoglu et al. (2000). 
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Emara and Chiu (2016) investigated the impact of governance on economic growth 
in 21 Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries between 2009 and 2013, 
using Principal component analysis (PCA) method of investigation reported that 
constant per capita income would rise by about 2% if composite government 
indicator increase by one unit. Contrarily, Yerrabati and Hawkes (2015) who 
investigated the governance and economic growth in south and East Asia and pacific 
region, using meta-synthesized technics based on 29 studies with 554 estimators 
found out that most governance indicators, other than government effectiveness and 
regulation have no important effect on growth. They concluded that empirical 
research on governance and growth has failed to provide evidence of true effect of 
governance on growth. 
Alomaisi et al (2016) in their analysis of the impact of governance on growth in 
Yemen, using multiple regression models found rule of law and political instability 
as the most important indicators of economic growth in Yemen, while other variables 
were declared no so significant. Kaufmann and Kraay (2012) on their paper titled 
Growth without Governance, using correlation analysis for 173 countries for the 
periods of 2000-2001 found that per capita income and the quality of governance are 
strongly positively correlated across countries. Furthermore, they adopted an 
empirical strategy that allows the separation of this correlation into two components; 
the first result confirms the existing evidence on the importance of good governance 
for economic development. However, the second result is rather unpopular and 
suggests that there is a virtuous circle in which higher incomes lead to further 
improvement in governance. This result is similar to the recent report from 
Habyarimana and Dushimayezu (2018) who studied good governance, economic 
growth, and development in Rwanda, adopting similar method of investigation found 
the existence of pro-cyclical relationship between governance and economic 
development. The paper did emphasize that the level of economic growth and 
development not only depend on fixed capital formation and labour force, but also 
on good governance. 
Bayar (2016) empirically investigated public governance and economic growth in 
the transnational economies of the European Union between 2002 and 2103, using 
static panel analysis revealed that all governance indicators except regulatory quality 
had a statistically positive impact on growth, and control of corruption and rule of 
law had the largest impact, while political stability had the lowest impact. In the 
same vein, Tarek and Ahmed (2013), adopted the same methodology to investigate 
governance and economic performance in developing countries reported similar 
result, claiming that the institutional failure that characterize developing countries 
lead inevitably to destabilize their long-term economic growth and an improvement 
in governance would contribute greatly to their economic growth. Author with 
similar method and results to Bayar (2016) and Tarek and Ahmed (2013) are Fayissa 
and Nsiah (2010) on 28 sub-African countries between 1990 and 2004, and Adams 
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and Mengistu (2008) on privatization, governance and economic development in 
developing countries between 1991 and 2002.  
Theoretical framework 
This study adopts the theoretical framework presented by Hall and Jones (1999) 
using the simplest Cobb-Douglas approach.  
Assume that the production function in country i is specified as follow; 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝐾𝑖
∝(𝐴𝑖𝐻𝑖)
1-α, ………………………………………………………….. (1) 
Where 𝐾𝑖 represents the stock of physical capital, 𝐻𝑖 , the amount of human capital – 
augmented labor employed in production, and 𝐴𝑖 , the labor –augmenting measure of 
productivity. It is assumed that labor Li is homogeneous within a country and that 
each unit of labor has gone through Ei years of training (education). Thus, Human 
capital-augmented labor is given by; 
𝐻𝑖 =
𝑒𝛷𝐸𝑖𝐿𝑖…………………………………………………………………………..(2) 
In equation two above, the function Φ (E) shows the efficiency of a unit of labor with 
E years of training relative to one with no training (Φ (0) = 0). The derivative Φ’ (E) 
is return to training estimated in a mincerian wage regression (Mincer 1974): an 
additional year of training raises a worker’s efficiency proportionally by Φ’ (E). This 
is suggested by Bils and Klenow (1996) that it is the appropriate way to incorporate 
training into an aggregate production function. It is noted that if Φ (E) = 0 for all E, 
it is the standard production function for undifferentiated labor.  
 
3. Methodology 
The study adopts a dynamic panel model in estimating the effect of governance on 
economic development in West Africa1 between 2002 and 2016. Dynamic panel 
estimation is more befitting in capturing the dynamic behavior of economic 
relationships. This model is closer to reality than any other panel model of estimation 
(Olubusoye et al., 2016). A typical dynamics panel model is specified as follow; 
𝑦𝑖𝑡=𝛿𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡
, β + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜂𝑖𝑡…………………………………………………..(1) 
Where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the regressand for individual country i over the period t, 𝑋′𝑖𝑡 is the 
matrix of exogenous variables for individual country over the period t, 𝑢𝑖 is the 
individual country specific effect, and 𝜂𝑖𝑡, the remainder disturbance term. 
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According to Batalgi (2008), dynamic model is characterized by two sources of 
persistency over time. First, autocorrelation resulting from the inclusion of lagged 
dependent variable as an explanatory variable. That is, 𝛿𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 is correlated with 
error tern 𝜂𝑖𝑡  (𝐸(𝛿𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 , 𝜂𝑖𝑡  ≠0)). Second is the unobserved main effects and 
interaction effect which characterized the heterogeneity among units.  
One of the important methods of estimating dynamic panel data models especially 
when dealing with many countries (N) and within a short time period (T) is the 
Arellano and Bond Generalized Method of Moment (GMM). This method was 
introduced by Arellano and Bond (1991) by differencing the dynamic model (eqn 1) 
to get rid of the two persistences1 associated with dynamic models. This explains the 
reasons why this model is also referred to as differenced GMM dynamic panel data 
estimator. Adopting this method, equation 1 becomes: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1= δ(𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−2) + β(𝑋𝑖𝑡
′ − 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1
′ ) + (𝜂𝑖𝑡 − 𝜂𝑖,𝑡−1)……… …...(2) 
Where (𝜂𝑖𝑡 − 𝜂𝑖,𝑡−1) is assumed to follow first order moving average with unit root. 
Although, all dynamic models are short-run model and can only estimate short-run 
coefficient, some manipulation are required to obtain long-run coefficient as 
demonstrated below; 
In the long-run, 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑦𝑖.𝑡−1; therefore, substituting into equation (1), we have, 
𝑦𝑖𝑡=𝛿𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡
, β + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜂𝑖𝑡……………………………………………      ….. (3) 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝛿𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑋𝑖𝑡
, β + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜂𝑖𝑡………………………………………                 (4) 








) represent long-run elasticity between Y and X, assuming δ < 1 and 
statistically significant (which is a necessary condition if the short-run model is to 
converge to a long-run solution (see Harris and Sollis, 2003). 
Diagnostic Tests 
Arellano and Bond (1991) proposed two test to validate the estimation. First is that 
there is no second-order serial correlation for the remaining disturbances of the 
differentiated equation. This is an essential condition as the consistency of GMM 
estimator rest on the assumption that E(∆𝜂𝑖𝑡-∆𝜂𝑖,𝑡−2)=0. It should be noted that first 
order is expected in the first differenced dynamic panel data models. Therefore, we 
reject null hypothesis of no autocorrelation for AR (1) and accept null hypothesis for 
AR (2).  
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heterogeneity and units. 
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Second is the instrument validity test. This becomes necessary because of the 
potential correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the remainder of the 
disturbance term (Olubusoye et al., 2016). In order to determine the validity of 
instruments used, the Sargan and Hansen test of over-identifying restriction have 
been suggested. For these two tests, we must accept the null hypothesis of validity 
of instruments (Roodman, 2009).  
Model Specification 
The model is specified into two categories: with and without control variables 
(Labour and Capital) in other to effectively achieve the objective of this study. 
Per capita growth = f( governance)……………………………………………(6) 
Per capita growth = f (capital, labour, 
governance)……………………………………………………….                  .(7) 
Reparametizing the specification above, we have;  
𝑝𝑐𝑔𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑝𝑐𝑔𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑗
′𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + µ𝑖,𝑡…………………………………….(8) 
𝑝𝑐𝑔𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑝𝑐𝑔𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑗
′𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖
′𝑐𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + µ𝑖,𝑡……………………………(9) 
Where pcg denotes per capita growth, α is the autoregressive parameter, 
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡  𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐 𝑜𝑓 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑐ℎ 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑑𝑒; voice and accountability (va), 
political stability (ps), regulatory quality (rq), rule of law (rof), control of corruption 
(coc) ang government effectiveness (ge) as identified by (Kaufmann et al., 2005). 
𝛽𝑗
′ is the coefficients of institution, 𝑐𝑖,𝑡, the control variables (growth rate of capital 
formation (gcf) and Labour force (in logarithm)), and 𝛾𝑖
′, the coefficients to the 
control variables. 𝜂𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑑 µ𝑖,𝑡  are as previously defined in the methodology. 
Scopes of Study and Sources of Data 
The study covers the periods of 2002 to 2016. It is limited to these periods because 
of availability of data. The data were source from two different sources; voice and 
accountability, political stability, regulatory quality, rule of law, control of 
corruption, government effectiveness were gotten from World Governance Index 
(2017), while per capital growth, growth of capital formation and labour force were 
extracted from World Development Index (2017). 
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4. Empirical Results and Findings 
MODEL 1:𝑝𝑐𝑔𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑝𝑐𝑔𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑗
′𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + µ𝑖,𝑡 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES SGMM1a SGMM1b SGMM1c SGMM1d 
L.pcg 0.126*** -0.0844 0.158 0.152 
 (0.0483) (0.285) (0.153) (0.263) 
Va 2.032** 3.521** 1.932** 2.700*** 
 (0.921) (1.386) (0.893) (1.043) 
Ps 0.585 1.081 0.547 1.145 
 (0.783) (0.972) (0.951) (1.080) 
Ge 2.414 3.011 2.666 3.259 
 (2.247) (2.695) (2.404) (2.463) 
Rq -2.678 -1.389 -3.264 -3.262 
 (3.329) (4.814) (4.024) (5.023) 
Rof 1.102 -1.363 1.699 0.0960 
 (2.571) (3.141) (2.920) (3.452) 
Coc -2.653 -3.156* -2.985* -3.259* 
 (1.714) (1.862) (1.785) (1.833) 
Constant 2.091*** 2.649** 1.998** 1.874 
 (0.566) (1.154) (0.836) (1.235) 
Observations 210 210 210 210 
Number of crossid 15 15 15 15 
firm effect YES YES YES YES 
year effect NO NO NO NO 
Hansen_test 5.932 2.980 3.732 4.710 
Hansen Prob 1 0.561 1 0.452 
Sargan_test 91.08 1.259 70.19 5.210 
Sargan Prob 0.0998 0.868 0.197 0.391 
AR(1)_test -2.311 -1.036 -2.150 -1.476 
AR(1)_P-value 0.0209 0.300 0.0315 0.140 
AR(2)_test -0.246 -0.482 -0.152 -0.107 
AR(2)_P-value 0.806 0.630 0.879 0.915 
No. of Instruments 83 12 69 13 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
SGMM1 denotes One-Step GMM. collapse the instrument matrix. a b c & d denote 
lag(1 6 
Lag (2 5) lag (2 6) & lag(3 7) respectively. 
From the model above, different lags ((1 6), (2 5), (2 6), and (3 7)) were introduced 
for the estimation. These lags were introduced to avoid instruments proliferation 
(Roodman, 2009). It was discovered that the model with lag (1 6) met all the 
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requirements for a valid model using system GMM, while the rest fall short. 
Therefore, the model with lag (1 6) (SGMM1a) will be considered for this analysis.  
The autoregressive parameter was shown to be less than one and statistically 
significant. According to Roodman (2009), the estimated coefficients on the lagged 
dependent variable (α) should be less than absolute unity, and statistically 
significant. If not, the system GMM is not valid. The estimated coefficient of the 
autoregressive parameter (α) lies within the range of dynamic stability with a value 
of 0.126, and statistically significant at 1%.  
The result shows that all governance indexes, other than regulatory quality and 
control of corruption are positively related to development in West Africa. The 
negative effect of control of corruption on development corroborates the findings of 
Yerrabati and Hawkes (2015) and the negative effect of regulatory quality on 
development corresponds to the findings of Bayar, 2016). From the findings, it is 
shown that a 1% increase in voice and accountability would improve economic 
development by 2.03%, and statistically significant at 5%. A 1% improvement in 
political stability would lead to 0.59% increase in economic development, in 
addition, a 1% increase in government effectiveness would accelerate economic 
growth by 2.41% and a 1% improvement in rule of law, improves developments by 
1.10%. However, political stability, government effectiveness and rule of law are not 
statistically significant. These results are similar to the findings of Knack and Keefer 
(1997); Campos and Nugent (1999). 
The robustness check shows that instrument are valid (from Hansen and Sargan test 
above), and there is no second order autocorrelation (AR(2)).   
MODEL 2: 𝑝𝑐𝑔𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑝𝑐𝑔𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑗
′𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖
′𝑐𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + µ𝑖,𝑡  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES SGMM1a SGMM1b SGMM1c SGMM1d 
L.pcg 0.106** -0.0751 0.0812 0.207 
 (0.0464) (0.282) (0.108) (0.308) 
Gcf 0.0559*** 0.0527* 0.0459** 0.0570** 
 (0.0183) (0.0317) (0.0209) (0.0287) 
Lnlf 1.656** 1.590** 1.545** 1.631** 
 (0.702) (0.710) (0.697) (0.730) 
Va 0.513 2.216 0.851 1.083 
 (1.201) (1.698) (1.052) (1.760) 
Ps 2.445** 2.612** 2.170* 2.724** 
 (1.169) (1.109) (1.201) (1.375) 
Ge 2.304 2.839 2.345 3.107 
 (2.002) (2.329) (2.165) (2.100) 
Rq -6.076 -4.489 -5.802 -7.015 
 (4.277) (6.186) (4.836) (6.704) 
Rof 1.355 -0.776 1.624 1.234 
 (2.627) (3.437) (2.755) (4.234) 
Coc -1.016 -2.042* -1.464 -2.039* 
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 (1.063) (1.169) (0.964) (1.122) 
Constant -24.38** -22.92** -22.37** -24.51** 
 (10.89) (11.67) (11.05) (12.05) 
Observations 202 202 202 202 
Number of crossed 15 15 15 15 
firm effect YES YES YES YES 
year effect NO NO NO NO 
Hansen_test 4.010 2.801 6.461 4.463 
Hansen Prob 1 0.592 1 0.485 
Sargan_test 84.71 1.542 69.48 4.320 
Sargan Prob 0.208 0.819 0.213 0.504 
AR(1)_test -2.427 -1.095 -2.625 -1.443 
AR(1)_P-value 0.0152 0.273 0.00868 0.149 
AR(2)_test -0.236 -0.436 -0.250 -0.0108 
AR(2)_P-value 0.813 0.663 0.803 0.991 
No. of Instruments 85 14 71 15 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
SGMM1 denotes One-Step GMM. collapse the instrument matrix. a b c & d denote 
lag(1 6) 
Lag (2 5), lag(2 6), & lag(3 7) respectively. 
Just like MODEL 1, lag (1 6), (2 5), (2 6) and (3 7), were used to estimate the model, 
and the model with lag (1 6) meet all criteria for a valid model using GMM. 
Therefore, the model with lag (1 6) (SGMMIa) will be considered.  
From model SGMMIa, the autoregressive parameter meets the dynamic stability 
condition of less than absolute 1 and it is statistically significant. The result validates 
Solow’s assertion of the importance of labour and capital in the economic 
development of a Nation. It shows that a 1% improvement in capital formation would 
accelerate growth by 0.06%, and statistically significant at 1%. Also, a 1 percent 
increase in labour force would facilitate development by 1.66%, and statistically 
significant at 5%. On governance, the result shows that, voice and accountability, 
political stability, government effectiveness and rule of law contribute positively to 
development, but it is political stability that exerts the most influence on 
development with a statistically significant positive coefficient of 2.45. However, 
regulatory quality and control of corruption are found to have an insignificantly 
negative effect on development in West Africa. The result confirms that the 
instruments are valid, and there is no higher other autocorrelation.  
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Table 1. Long-run coefficients (
𝜷
𝟏− 𝜹
) from SGMM1a 
variables with capital and labour without capital and labour 
gcf 0.062527964 -  
lnlf 1.754051478 -  
va -0.782012195 2.324942792 
ps 5.020533881 0.585 
ge -1.594463668 2.414 
rg 4.659509202 2.59496124 
rof 0.191492369 2.655421687 
coc 2.861971831 1.876237624 
Source: Author’s computation 
The results above show that with labour and capital in the model, all variables other 
than voice and accountability and government effectiveness contribute positively to 
growth. That is, in the long-run, with a given level of labour and capital, voice and 
accountability, as well as government effectiveness contribute negatively to 
development. Conversely, the model that factors in only governance shows that in 
the long-run, all governance indicators contributes positively to growth in West 
Africa.  
 
5. Conclusion and Recommendation 
Having empirically investigated the role of governance in the economic development 
of West Africa Sub-Region between the periods of 2002 and 2016, it was found that 
governance is an important determinant of growth in the region with or without 
capital and labour. Particularly, governance was found to contribute more to 
development in the long-run than in the short-run. These findings are consistent with 
the findings of Tarek and Ahmed (2013) on developing countries, Alomaisi et al 
(2016) on Yemen, Habtumu (2008). Therefore, the poor economic performance of 
West African countries can be partly attributed to poor governance in the Sub-region. 
It is therefore recommended that West African countries should encourage 
continuity of government to facilitate political stability, allow for true democracy by 
providing mechanisms that allow the voice of the citizens to be held and put in place 
strong institutions that promote accountability, limit corruption and facilitate 
operation of the rule of law.  
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